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Barbuto does not dispute that a physician who makes unauthorized and/or false 
disclosures about a former patient's medical condition for the physician's personal gain 
may be subject to liability. As discussed in Sorensens' initial brief, most courts recognize 
a cause of action under such circumstances, usually under one or more of the following 
theories: 1) breach of implied contract; 2) breach of confidentiality and/or fiduciary 
duties, and 3) invasion of privacy. {See Brief of Appellants at 12). 
Utah courts have likewise recognized for half a century that physicians are 
fiduciaries and owe duties of confidentiality to their patients. {Id. at 21). In light of this 
established authority, Barbuto's statement that "Sorensens admit they are attempting to 
create new law" is perplexing. {See Appellees' Brief at 6). The law is fairly clear; the 
only issue is whether the allegations of Sorensens' complaint, and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn therefrom, state a claim under any theory of liability. 
In arguing that they do not, Barbuto offers several contentions. Before addressing 
those, however, one matter should be clarified. Barbuto implies on several occasions that 
Sorensens' claim is based upon the disclosure of Nicholas Sorensens' medical records. 
{See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 4, 17 "Confidentiality of a patient's medical records is not 
absolute," 32 ("Dr. Barbuto was not the source of disclosure of Nicholas's confidential 
medical records"), and 38 ("The release of Dr. Barbuto's medical records for Mr. 
Sorensen resulted from Sorensens placing his physical condition at issue")). 
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Barbuto also implies that Sorensens' claim is based upon Barbuto's review of 
medical records generated by other health care providers, or the mere act of "providing 
expert opinions". {See id. at 4, 9 ("Stripped to its legal essentials, Sorensens['] claim 
against Dr. Barbuto is that he breached a duty of physician-patient confidentiality by 
providing expert opinions on the cause of Nicholas's medical symptoms to counsel 
defending against his personal injury claim"), 16, 30 ("the expert opinion is reached in the 
sterile review of medical records"), and 32). 
Neither suggestion is accurate. Nicholas Sorensen's medical records had already 
been provided; no claim is made regarding the records themselves. Likewise, no claim 
would likely have resulted if Barbuto had simply provided normal expert service, 
reviewing records of other health care providers and rendering opinions thereon. 
However, Barbuto was not opining on another health care provider's diagnosis or 
treatment of Nicholas Sorensen's condition - Barbuto was changing his own diagnosis. 
That is not the function of an expert witness. That is the act of a treating physician.1 
What Sorensens actually base their claim on may be broadly summarized in two 
areas: 1) Barbuto's discussion of his unwritten impressions and observations regarding 
Nicholas Sorensen's medical condition with Sorensen's adversary, ex parte and without 
notice, and 2) making false disclosures for financial gain. 
As noted in Sorensens' initial brief, opposing counsel's letter retaining Barbuto sought 
Barbuto's views, "as [Sorensen's] treating physician early on in his injury, about his 
current condition." (Brief of Appellants at 35 n. 7; emphasis added). 
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Barbuto's brief does not address Sorensens' contention that false disclosures, even 
if otherwise authorized, constitute a breach of confidentiality. Nor can he - to argue 
otherwise would be both counterintuitive and a rather disturbing position for a physician 
(or anyone) to take. Accordingly, the allegations in Sorensens' Complaint that Barbuto 
made false disclosures state a claim upon which Sorensens may seek relief. This ground 
in itself compels reversal of the trial court's order. 
In one of several instances where Barbuto recharacterizes Sorensens' arguments 
and then argues against his own characterization, Barbuto claims that Sorensens "would 
prohibit a physician from testifying truthfully if the truth was adverse to the patient 
recovering a monetary judgment." (Appellees' Brief at 24.) Having set up that straw 
man, Barbuto then knocks it down by stating that all witnesses should be able to testify 
truthfully. That assertion is not only self-evident but ironic, in that a key component of 
Sorensens' claims is that Barbuto provided false information for monetary gain. 
In a related vein, Barbuto accuses plaintiff of "alleging] irrelevant, inaccurate and 
insulting 'facts' relating to Dr. Barbuto's alleged involvement with 'defense attorneys.'" 
According to Barbuto, the motives behind his actions should be irrelevant in this case. 
(Appellees' Brief at 7). The problem with that assertion is that motives are an important 
consideration in several of Sorensens' claims. Motives may negate a defense of honest 
mistake. They suggest malice. They support outrageousness for an intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim. From a practical perspective, motives are also important at 
trial for the simple reason that juries want to understand why parties did what they did. 
3 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO IMPLIED 
CONTRACT CLAIMS MAY BE MADE AGAINST PHYSICIANS IN 
UTAH. 
A. Implied contracts are enforceable against physicians. 
Barbuto does not dispute the principle - established in Utah for decades - that an 
implied contractual relationship arises as a matter of law in the physician-patient 
relationship. Barbuto argues, however, that such a contract is not "legal" (i.e., actionable) 
because, by definition, an implied contract is not in writing. 
As in the trial court, Barbuto relies on Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6, which provides: 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of result. 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an 
alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be 
obtained from any health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or 
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an 
authorized agent of the provider. 
In spite of the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 (reinforced by its title) 
limiting its scope to guarantees, warranties, contracts or assurances of result, Barbuto 
argues that the statute really bars all contract claims. Without analysis, Barbuto ignores 
the qualifying words "of result to be obtained" and instead argues that the statute is 
without limit, that "no liability based upon a contract" can be enforced unless it is in 
writing. (Appellees5 Brief at 10; emphasis added). 
This argument cannot withstand review of the statutory language itself, or the 
historical context in which it was enacted, which was to curb a specific type of lawsuit 
that was gaining popularity in the 1960s and 1970s. (See Brief of Appellants at 14-16). 
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Barbuto omits any mention of the background of the statute, or of the authority cited by 
Sorensens addressing similar statutes. 
Barbuto next claims that "the [Health Care Malpractice] Act establishes the 
legislature's intent that contract claims against a health care provider not be the basis of 
independent causes of action." His sole authority for that proposition is the definition of 
the phrase "malpractice action against a health care provider," which includes claims 
sounding "in contract, tort, breach of warranty," etc. (Appellees' Brief at 10). 
Sorensens are unsure how this argument helps Barbuto. If anything, the definition 
recognizes that malpractice claims may be based upon contract. The statute does not bar 
claims within its scope; it merely requires them to be adjudicated in accordance with its 
provisions. The Sorensens went through the pre-litigation medical malpractice process. 
Accordingly, Barbuto's theory that "the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act subsumes 
contract claims" would not affect the Sorensens' claim in any event. 
Although it does not affect Sorensens' entitlement to recovery, it should be noted 
that Barbuto's reliance upon the Health Care Malpractice Act would not survive the Utah 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P.3d 915. In that 
case, the court affirmed this Court's ruling that the Act applies only when a breach occurs 
"during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Id. (reversing dismissal of 
former patient's alienation of affections claim against therapist). Throughout his brief, 
Barbuto emphasizes that his physician-patient relationship with Nicholas Sorensen had 
ended before his alleged breaches of confidence occurred. (See Appellees' Brief at 3, 4, 
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6, 16, 17, 27, 30, 31). Accordingly, none of Sorensens' claims would be subject to the 
Act, let alone barred by it. 
In sum, Barbuto's contract argument ignores the plain language of Section 78-14-
6, the statute's historical context, and Utah Supreme Court precedent. The trial court's 
ruling that no implied contract claims can ever be brought against a physician was 
erroneous, and must be reversed. 
As a fallback argument, Barbuto attempts to recharacterize Sorensens' argument 
so as to fall within Section 78-14-6's prohibitions, arguing: "In short, Sorensens claim 
that Dr. Barbuto breached a 'guarantee' to his patient that he would not reveal 
confidential information without permission. Alternatively, the allegation is that Dr. 
Barbuto 'warranted' that such confidential information would not be disclosed." 
(Appellees' Brief at 9). Whatever the merit of rewriting a plaintiffs allegations in 
connection with a motion to dismiss, even Barbuto's version would not fall within the 
statute's scope: neither claim has anything to do with a guarantee or warranty of a 
particular result. 
B. Sorensens sufficiently alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Assuming that an implied contract existed between Sorensens and him, Barbuto 
says "[t]here is nothing in the complaint which supports an allegation that Dr. Barbuto 
agreed not to discuss Nicholas's medical treatment with defense attorneys in the context 
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of a personal injury action where he is statutorily privileged to do so." (Appellees' Brief 
at 12). 
Of course, that recharacterization of the issue begs the question: Obviously, 
Sorensens would not allege (since they do not agree) that Barbuto was "statutorily 
privileged" to do what he did. Noting that contracts contain by implication the law that 
exists at the time of contracting, Barbuto says he cannot have breached his implied 
contractual duties because he was legally entitled to do what he did. (See Appellees' 
Brief at 13, citing Utah Rule of Evidence 506 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4).) 
There are two problems with that assertion. The first is Barbuto's fundamental 
misassumption that a lawful act cannot breach an implied duty of good faith. Years of 
Utah precedent hold otherwise. See, e.g., Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, 
94 P.3d 193, Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 
P.2d 445, 451-52, 458 (Utah App.1994), St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) (all recognizing otherwise lawful acts as 
violative of the covenant). Any other conclusion would reduce the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing to nothing more than the already-existing requirement that a party not do 
something illegal. 
In any event, Dr. Barbuto's assumption that he was legally permitted to breach 
Sorensens' confidence is erroneous. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
Barbuto further suggests that a breach of implied contractual duties cannot be 
found unless a breach of express provisions has occurred, and that "a party's contractual 
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obligations cannot 'be enlarged and expended by means of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually 
made.'" (Appellees' Brief at 13-14). 
A similar argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Christiansen v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2005 UT 21, 116 P.3d 259. There, the court pointed out 
that duties implied by law are not dependent or conditioned upon express duties. In that 
case, the plaintiff asserted two claims: one seeking underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits 
under an insurance policy, and a second alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing by the insurer. Farmers resisted discovery on the bad faith claim while the 
contract claim was in arbitration, arguing that the bad faith claim could not proceed until 
the plaintiff established a breach of the contract's express terms. Id, Tf 3. 
The trial court rejected the defendant's argument, ruling that "the two claims were 
independent of each other and could therefore be pursued simultaneously." Id, If 4. The 
Supreme Court affirmed, noting that claims for breach of contract and for bad faith are 
"premised on distinct duties that give rise to divergent and severable causes of action": 
A breach of express contract claim arises out of the express terms of the contract, 
and the breach is proven in relation to those terms. . . . A claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by contrast, is based on judicially 
recognized duties not found within the four corners of the contract. These duties, 
unlike the duties expressly stated in the contract, are not subject to alteration by the 
parties. 
Id, f 10 (citation omitted). 
Barbuto disregards "the subtle but important distinction between invoking the 
implied covenant to compel a contracting party to honor the 'agreed common purpose' 
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and 'justified expectations' of another party to the contract, and injecting it to 'establish 
new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties' or to 'nullify a right 
granted by a contract to one of the parties.'" Eggett, 2004 UT 28, f 44 (Nehring, J., 
concurring; citations omitted). In this case, there is no conflict between the implied duty 
of confidentiality and any other duties that Barbuto had. 
Whether a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing could be found in 
this case will depend, in part, upon the parties' expectations under the contract. In the 
context of the implied contract existing between physician and patient, the expectation of 
confidentiality has been recognized for thousands of years. See, e.g., the Hippocratic 
Oath and the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics. (Brief of Appellants at 18-20). There 
can be no dispute that confidentiality is part of a physician's good faith duties. 
C. Sorensens sufficiently alleged contract-based damages. 
Acknowledging that a complaint need not establish an evidentiary basis for the 
plaintiffs damages, Barbuto nonetheless claims that Sorensens did not allege sufficient 
facts to demonstrate "potential damages." Barbuto argues that the Sorensens had to plead 
facts from which specific "economic damages" were "contemplated or foreseen by Mr. 
Sorensen or Dr. Barbuto." (Appellees' Brief at 15). 
Barbuto states that Sorensens are asserting a private right of action from breach of these 
long-established medical ethics, and then spends three pages refuting that non-existent 
argument. (Appellees' Brief at 27-30). As Sorensens' initial brief indicated, the 
relevance of these standards is that they establish the expectations of parties to an implied 
contract between physician and patient. (Brief of Appellants at 17-20). Sorensens have 
not argued in this appeal that the breach of the standards is in itself actionable, except as 
they happen to be coextensive with legal duties and public policy. 
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This argument misstates the actual test. A party need not allege that specific 
damages were in fact contemplated or foreseen; it is sufficient if a reasonable inference 
may be drawn that such damages were "reasonably within the contemplation of, or 
reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Black v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66, % 28, 100 P.3d 1163 (emphasis added). Could Barbuto 
reasonably foresee that a breach of his duties might cause the expenditure of attorney fees 
and expense, as Sorensens allege in their complaint? How could he not? 
Moreover, Barbuto's suggestion that economic loss must be specified to avoid 
dismissal is inconsistent with Machan v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, 
2005 UT 37, 116 P.3d 342, and cases cited therein. In Machan, the Utah Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that recovery for breach of contract is not limited to economic loss, but may 
include emotional distress and similar harm. Id. at ^ 12, 16, 19 n. 2, 30. 
As a final note, Sorensens noted in their initial brief (and Barbuto does not dispute) 
that their complaint requested equitable relief, and therefore the alleged absence of pled 
damages at law would not be a basis for dismissing the complaint anyway. (See Brief of 
Appellants at 43 n. 10.) 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO CLAIM CAN 
BE MAINTAINED FOR BARBUTO'S ALLEGED BREACH OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES. 
Barbuto acknowledges that physicians owe their patients a duty of confidentiality 
to patients. He also "does not dispute that the physician-patient relationship creates a type 
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of fiduciary duty to the patient." (Appellees' Brief at 27).4 In seeking affirmance of the 
lower court's dismissal of these claims, Barbuto relies principally upon two arguments. 
The first is that "the only confidences which Dr. Barbuto had a duty to preserve 
(those related to communications and treatment during his treatment period) were already 
disclosed by Nicholas [Sorensen] as part of the personal injury action." (Appellees' Brief 
at 16). With respect to this point, Barbuto repeatedly emphasizes that he was no longer 
Nicholas Sorensen's physician at the time he made the disclosures. 
This argument misses the point. Sorensens' complaint alleges that, after the 
relationship ended, Barbuto improperly disclosed confidential information relating to 
communications and treatment that took place before the relationship ended. Barbuto 
does not claim that a physician's duties of confidentiality evaporate upon termination of 
the relationship. Barbuto states: "Admittedly, a limited duty of confidentiality survived 
that termination, but Sorensens point to no authority that any other duty continued once 
the relationship was over." (Appellees' Brief at 27). Given that the heart of Sorensens' 
Barbuto says in passing that the Sorensens did not plead fiduciary duties in their 
Complaint. (Appellees' Brief at 27). To the contrary, Sorensens' allegations included 
that "[professional medical standards regarding the relationship between physicians and 
patients outline the fiduciary-type duties owed by defendants to Nicholas Sorensen, 
including the duty to work in the best interest of a patient's health to protect the patient's 
privacy." (R. 9, Tf 34); see also R. 54 (citing physician's "fiducia[ry]" duties, and alleging 
that "the failure to advise Plaintiffs of the revised opinion and disclosure of such opinions 
is clearly a breach of the fiduciary duties of a physician"). If Barbuto means to complain 
that there was no cause of action specifically labeled 'breach of fiduciary duty,' such 
labels are not required under principles of notice pleading. Nor is it a basis to sustain a 
motion to dismiss. The court may grant such a motion only if there is no possible set of 
facts that would sustain any claim. 
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case is Barbuto's post-termination breach of confidentiality, this acknowledgment is all 
Sorensens need to establish their claim, unless Barbuto can prevail on his waiver defense. 
On this issue, Sorensens agree that a limited waiver occurs with respect to medical 
information when the patient's medical condition is at issue. Sorensens do not agree with 
- nor do most recent cases or public policy support - Barbuto's suggestion that there are 
no restrictions or duties with regard to a physician's disclosure of medical information to 
third parties under such circumstances. 
To support his contention that physicians are bound by no restrictions when 
disclosing medical information if a patient has filed a personal injury suit, Barbuto first 
cites U.R.E. 506. However, that rule addresses only the issue of privilege within the 
context of admissibility of evidence. It does not authorize ex parte communications or 
the disclosure of confidential information outside a testimonial setting. Moreover, this 
Court has already recognized that, even when a limited waiver occurs pursuant to Rule 
506, it is not unlimited; a patient must still have notice and a fair opportunity to assert his 
privilege. DeBry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, H 27, 999 P.2d 582. 
In DeBry, this Court followed the Utah Supreme Court's lead in State v. Cardall, 
1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d 79. In Cardall, the court held that an alleged rape victim's medical 
records were directly at issue in a criminal case, and therefore the normal physician-
patient privilege was waived pursuant to Rule 506. Significantly, however, the Court did 
not allow unfettered disclosure as Barbuto seeks here. Rather, the court said, "the 
defendant does not have the right to examine all of the confidential information or to 
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search through state files without supervision." Id., ^ 30 (citation omitted). Before the 
defendant could see the records, the court held, an in camera review would have to 
establish their materiality. Id. 
That some restrictions exist even when a partial waiver exists is thus established in 
Utah. The question is: what restrictions? Barbuto says there are none. But under DeBry 
and Cardall (and a majority of cases from other jurisdictions), at a minimum, prior notice 
to the patient and an opportunity for the patient to protect his rights are required. That 
means no ex parte communications (unless the patient has been notified and elected not to 
participate). 
As noted in Sorensens' initial brief, the modern trend is to deem unauthorized ex 
parte disclosures a breach of confidentiality. (Brief of Appellants at 23-30). In an ex 
parte setting, the sole responsibility for protecting a patient's rights rests with persons 
untrained in the law and with the adversary's attorney. The risk of abuse, whether 
inadvertent or otherwise, is palpable. While this Court need not adopt a particular 
investigative method in order to find Barbuto's disclosures actionable, alternatives 
include allowing the plaintiffs attorney to be present during interviews, providing a list 
of questions prior to an interview, requiring the use of depositions, etc. See id. 
In response, Barbuto relies primarily upon a handful of cases that did indeed 
decline to impose any restrictions on ex parte contact between physicians and opposing 
attorneys. See, e.g., Glenn v. Kerlin, 248 So.2d 834 (La. App. 1971); Brandt v. Medical 
Defense Associates, 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Street v. Hedgepath, 607 
13 
A.2d 1238 (D.CApp. 1992); Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952 (Ala. 1984). There are cases 
holding as defendant urges—just not many these days. 
Additionally, not all of defendant's cited cases have fared well over time. In 
Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. 1988), for example, the intermediate 
court issued an opinion allowing ex parte communications between physicians and 
opposing counsel—which was promptly eviscerated. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
quickly clarified by rule that ex parte contacts are not allowed in that state. P.R.Civ.P. 
4003.6 (limiting the obtaining of information from a treating physician to written consent 
or through court-authorized discovery methods) (promulgated "in the wake of Moses", 
White v. Behlke, 2004 WL 1570095, 65 Pa. D. & C. 4th 479). Further calling Moses into 
question, a subsequent lower-court opinion cited a long line of authority indicating that, 
Moses notwithstanding, ex parte contact had long been prohibited in Pennsylvania. Id. 
The governing principle cannot be stated better than this Court did in DeBry: 
"[U]nder these circumstances [a Rule 506 waiver], a patient must at least be afforded the 
opportunity for protection. As part of a therapeutic relationship, a doctor or therapist has 
an obligation to protect the confidentiality of his patients that transcends any duty he has 
as a citizen to voluntarily provide information that might be relevant in pending 
litigation." 2000 UT App 58, «|f 28. 
Faced with authority from this Court and the Utah Supreme Court that Rule 506 
waivers are not without limits, Barbuto resorts to a state statute that has been expressly 
superceded, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4). The subsection provides: 
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A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a 
civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was 
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. However, this privilege 
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which the patient places 
his medical condition at issue as an element or factor of his claim or defense. 
Under those circumstances, a physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or 
treated that patient for the medical condition at issue may provide information, 
interviews, reports, records, statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the 
patient's medical condition and treatment which are placed at issue. 
As noted, that statute has been superceded. See DeBry, 2000 UT App 58, \ 24 n. 2 
("The statutory privilege has no further effect. Physician-patient and therapist-patient 
privileges are now exclusively controlled by Rule 506"). While Barbuto acknowledges 
DeBry, he nonetheless argues that "the statute has never been repealed," and that only the 
first two sentences of the statute were superceded, not the third. (Appellees' Brief at 18). 
There are multiple difficulties with this argument. First, whether the statute has 
been repealed is immaterial. It is well known that a number of outdated, unconstitutional, 
or otherwise superceded statutes remain on the books. The fact remains that the adoption 
of rules of evidence is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not the 
legislature. 
Barbuto's argument that only part of subsection 4 was superceded is contrary to 
the Court's statement in DeBry, and to the advisory committee note accompanying Rule 
506, which states that subsection 78-24-8(4) (not "two of its three sentences") were 
intended to be superceded by the rule. Additionally, Barbuto reads too much into the 
third sentence, which says nothing about non-testimonial disclosures of confidential 
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information. Rather, it merely indicates the scope of information that a physician could 
disclose when testifying as a witness. 
Section 24 of Title 78 addresses, by its terms, "Witnesses." Every provision in 
Section 24 deals exclusively with witnesses in court proceedings (e.g., competency to be a 
witness, interpreters, subpoenas, rights of witnesses, administering of oaths). Indeed, the 
words preceding the language cited by Barbuto state: 'There are particular relations in 
which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate. 
Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in the following cases[.]" Section 
78-24-8 (emphasis added). The statute addressed only the circumstances when a 
physician could provide - in the context of testimony - otherwise privileged medical 
information. Thus, not only has the statute been superceded, but it provides no support 
for Barbuto's argument.5 
Finally, Barbuto claims that he did not breach his duties as a physician because the 
Utah State Bar has opined that it is not a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
for attorneys to engage in ex parte communications. That is immaterial, of course—an 
opposing attorney owes no duty of confidentiality to a patient. A physician does. An 
opposing attorney is not a fiduciary of the patient. A physician is. DeBry had been on 
the books for three years when, for financial gain, Barbuto acted directly in contradiction 
5
 The fact that Section 78-24-8(4) was enacted in the section governing "Witnesses," 
rather than in Title 58, which governs the conduct of health care providers, belies 
Barbuto's unsupported assertion that the third sentence is a "substantive" regulation on 
the conduct of physicians that cannot be superceded by the Utah Supreme Court. 
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to the standards laid out in that case. There are no rules or statutes justifying his alleged 
misconduct in this case. 
III. BARBUTO'S ALLEGED ACTIONS VIOLATED THE GENERAL 
DUTIES OWED BY A PHYSICIAN TO A PATIENT. 
Case law holds that, if a physician learns that his prior diagnosis was wrong or 
requires clarification, he has a duty to disclose it to the patient, even if the physician-
patient has since ended. Barbuto himself admits that, "[a]rguably, if there is a change in 
information which affects the patient's well-being with respect to conditions being 
treated, the duty to inform might continue after termination of the relationship." 
(Appellees' Brief at 30). That is what Sorensens are alleging. Barbuto says he concluded 
that his prior diagnosis had "created a mythology" in Nicholas Sorensens' treatment - a 
change that he was obligated to report (rather than take steps to conceal). Sorensens' 
allegations state a claim for negligence. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT SORENSEN 
COULD NOT MAINTAIN A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF PRIVACY. 
The right of privacy is invaded by, among other things, unreasonable publicity 
given to the other's private life, or publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false 
light before the public. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988). As Sorensens 
noted in their initial brief, it is unclear how many people received the confidential 
information. The allegations of the complaint permit a reasonable inference that it was 
more than a small group as Barbuto suggests. 
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Additionally, Barbuto's breaches required Sorensens to file his deposition 
testimony with the Court in order to obtain partial relief (the exclusion of his testimony). 
When an inevitable and reasonable consequence of a breach of confidence is making part 
of the information public, a claim should be permitted for breach of privacy. 
Finally, Barbuto does not refute Sorensens' argument that no "body count" is 
required when a confidence is breached by a fiduciary. See 11 C.J.S. Right of Privacy 
and Publicity (2005, § 25). For each of these reasons, the trial court erred in dismissing 
Sorensen's claim for invasion of privacy. 
In his brief, Barbuto argues that the "judicial proceeding privilege" bars plaintiffs 
privacy claims. Barbuto admits that he never raised this issue with the trial court. 
(Appellees' Brief at 36) ("the issue of privilege was not argued before the trial court"). 
However, Barbuto cites Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ^ 
67, 70 P.3d 17, as authority for this Court to rely on any argument to affirm a dismissal. 
While the Bennett court did not indicate whether the alternative ground had been 
raised below, appellate courts in Utah have long imposed that requirement. See 438 Main 
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 51, 99 P.3d 801, and cases cited (to preserve an 
issue for appeal, it must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the court has an 
opportunity to rule on the issue; "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the 
issue must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority"; issues not raised at trial are usually 
deemed waived). 
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There are several reasons why Barbuto's new argument should not be heard for the 
first time on appeal. It is questionable whether the privilege would extend to professional 
witnesses, or to Barbuto's non-testimonial disclosures. It would not apply if Barbuto 
acted with malice. It would not apply if the statements were published to anyone who 
lacked a legal right to receive them. See DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, ffif 12, 21, 992 
P.2d 979. Such issues should be hashed out in the trial court in the first instance (also 
affording the plaintiff an opportunity to seek leave to amend if appropriate), rather than 
asking this Court to decide them on an incomplete record. 
V. SORENSENS STATE A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
On appeal, Barbuto appears to have abandoned the argument made below that his 
conduct could not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because 
it was fairly debatable. Instead, Barbuto's principal argument is that he is protected from 
an IIED claim by the judicial-proceedings privilege. 
As noted above, this issue was never raised below, and should not be considered 
by the Court. Issues exist regarding Barbuto's status as a paid witness, (in)applicability 
of the privilege to Barbuto's informal disclosures, malice, and excessive publication, all 
of which render affirmance on this ground inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court to reverse 
the judgment of the district court. 
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